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Abstract Making errors is part of normal human behaviour. However when errors
have significant consequences or occur in high risk industries they become of
paramount importance. There has been little research in why and how errors occur
in the healthcare industry. Errors occur throughout healthcare, but in particular,
surgery as a high risk speciality. Surgery is a dynamic speciality with a milieu of
possible mishaps waiting to happen. So to understand and prevent errors in surgery
we must explore this intricate multi-cogwheel process. This article will summarise
the epidemiology of surgical errors, factors which influence them in the patient
pathway, explain concepts and models of why errors occur, technical skill error
assessment and possible strategies to prevent or reduce surgical errors. Practicing
surgery in the new millennium will embrace new innovations, medications,
technologies, equipment, operations, all which aim to improve the treatment
and care of patients. However we must remember with this constant evolution in
healthcare the error goalposts are forever moving, so we must be vigilant not to
take our eye off the error ball.
ª 2005 Surgical Associates Ltd. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.Introduction
Making errors is part of normal human behaviour.1
However, when errors have significant consequen-
ces or occur in high risk industries they become of
paramount importance. Society and the media are
generally intolerable of people making mistakes
which may cause human suffering, and therefore
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doi:10.1016/j.ijsu.2005.04.003cultivate a blame culture. As a result of high profile
accidents which have caused many deaths, high
risk industries like aviation, space travel, military,
nuclear and oilrigs2 have spent the last few years
investing in the understanding, identification and
error prevention training in their respective in-
dustries. All of these industries have the financial
resources to invest in the research and develop-
ment of error prevention. Most of these industries
work in controlled environments and hence a
lot of their error training and prevention have
concentrated on simulations and re-enacting major
incidents.3 Despite this, major errors still occurlished by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
76 S.K. Sarker, C. Vincentwith significant loss of life e.g. the Space Shuttle
explosions, Gulf and Iraq War friendly fire deaths.
Medical blunders are periodically brandished
across the newspapers and the news, which always
attract the public’s attention and concerns. How-
ever, there has been little research in why and how
errors occur in the healthcare industry. Most of the
current research has been on the prevention of
drug errors and the estimation and epidemiology
of adverse events occurring to inpatients.4e7 How-
ever, these epidemiological estimates are only the
tip of the error iceberg in healthcare. Errors occur
throughout healthcare, but in particular, surgery
as a high risk speciality, has been shown to have
a detrimental effect on patients with one study
quoting an annual incidence rate of adverse events
among patients having an operation as 3.0%, of
which half were preventable.8 James Reason’s
definition of an error is ‘a failure of a planned
action to achieve a desired goal’.9 However, this is
probably too simple to explain why errors occur in
surgery and in healthcare. Almost all surgeons and
healthcare professionals are well motivated and
care about patients’ treatment and safety.10 A
recent initiative by the Chief Medical Officer in the
UK, has lead to the establishment of the UK
National Patients Safety Agency (NPSA) as a result
of the consultation document ‘‘An organization
with a memory’’.39 The NPSA, an independent
body, aims to defend and actively promote patient
safety in the NHS.
Surgery is a dynamic speciality with a milieu of
possible mishaps waiting to happen. Surgical com-
petency is a combination of technical skill, team
performance and communication and decision
making.11 All these factors affect the surgical
patients’ pathway from the initial pre-operative
clinic appointment to the final post-operative
discharge clinic appointment. So to understand
and prevent errors in surgery we must explore this
intricate multi-cogwheel process.
This article will summarise the epidemiology of
surgical errors, factors which influence them in the
patient pathway, explain concepts and models of
why errors occur, technical skill error assessment
and possible strategies to prevent or reduce
surgical errors.
Epidemiology of adverse events
Aggregate studies
Iatrogenic effects of drugs and other treatments
have been recorded in many studies, but only
recently has the scale of injury to patients becomeapparent. The Harvard study4 found that patients
were unintentionally harmed by treatment in
almost 4% of admissions in New York State. For
70% of patients the resulting disability was slight or
temporary, but in 7% it was permanent and 14% of
patients died partly as a result of their treatment.4
Serious harm therefore came to about 1% of
patients admitted to hospital. Similar findings
were reported from Colorado and Utah.8 A parallel
Australian study found a 16.6% adverse event rate,
with about half the cases being judged prevent-
able, though with a similar number of serious
incidents to the United States studies. A United
Kingdom study12 carried out a review of 1014
records finding a 10.8% adverse events rate, again
about half were preventable. Emerging findings in
New Zealand and Denmark also suggest a relatively
high rate of adverse events around 10%.
Adverse events in surgery
A significant percentage of these adverse events
are associated with a surgical procedure. The
Harvard study found 47.7% and the Australian
study found 50.4% of adverse events were associ-
ated with a surgical operation. The Utah Colorado
Medical Practice Study provided additional data on
operative events.8 The annual incidence rate of
adverse events among hospitalised patients who
received an operation was 3.0%. Among all surgical
events, 54% were preventable. Eight operations
were ‘‘high risk’’ based upon their preventable
adverse event rate: lower extremity bypass graft
(11.0%), abdominal aortic aneurysm repair (8.1%),
colon resection (5.9%), coronary artery bypass
graft/cardiac valve surgery (4.7%), transurethral
resection of the prostate or of a bladder tumour
(3.9%), cholecystectomy (3.0%), hysterectomy
(2.8%), and appendectomy (1.5%). Technique-
related complications, wound infections, and
post-operative bleeding produced nearly half of
all surgical adverse events.
In the UK, complication rates for some of the
major operations are 20e25% with an acceptable
mortality of 5e10%.13 However, at least 30e50% of
major complications occurring in patients undergo-
ing general surgical procedures are thought to be
avoidable.14 The wide variation in surgical compli-
cation rates between different centres and differ-
ent surgeons would support this view. Many adverse
events classified as operative are, on closer exam-
ination, found to be due to problems in ward
management rather than intra-operative care. For
instance, Neale et al.15 identified preventable
pressure sores, chest infections, falls, poor care of
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together with a variety of problems with the
administration of drugs and intravenous fluids.
Occurrence of surgical errors
Surgical competency involves a combination of
good decision making (pre-operatively, operatively
and post-operatively), team performance and
communication (surgical, anaesthetic, nursing
and other essential staff members) and technical
skill. These skills coupled with a high patient
volume operating rate tend to achieve a reduced
patient mortality and morbidity.16,17 It is unlikely
that no errors occur throughout this process, even
for the most simple of cases. Taking the example
of the lead surgeon, he or she will be constantly
checking and re-checking documentation, salient
communications; re-appraising the clinical and
theatre setting; and constantly re-evaluating the
patient’s care and the progress of the operation.
This is done in the aim to reduce the error rate
occurring during this process to a bare minimum.
But errors still happen. Protocols have been
advocated to reduce surgical error e.g. wrong site
surgery18 in the aim to reduce surgical errors which
can be prevented by adhering to strict protocols.
However, the occurrence of surgical error is part of
a multifaceted phenomenon and possibly adhering
to protocols is only part of the answer.
This is because a cascade of glitches from various
elements, with different controlling factors,
can/may culminate into a catastrophe or adverse
event. This Swiss cheese model (Fig. 1) character-
ises healthcare, in that the system may look
robust but with a closer look it is full of holes.19
Concepts of errors
To understand why errors occur generically
the psychologist Rasmussen developed the Skill,
Figure 1 Reason’s Swiss cheese model.Knowledge & Rule Error Model (Fig. 2).20 At the skill
level, actions are automatic, and are enacted by
way of ‘‘stored patterns of pre-programmed in-
structions’’. These actions are frequently per-
formed and are often said to ‘come naturally’ to
the operator. However, these skills can be acquired
with practice. On a rule level, tasks are completed
using stored sets of rules. These rules consist of
familiar, rehearsed patterns of actions. Tasks
which use rule-based cognitive mechanisms require
a greater degree of thought than skill-based tasks,
as the rules which need to be applied to complete
the situation must be selected. On a knowledge
level, unfamiliar tasks are performed with a high
degree of conscious thought as the operator
attempts to devise a novel solution to a situation
which has not previously been encountered.
Reason used Rasmussen’s classification as
a framework for his categorisation of errors,
attaching a specific type of error to the three
levels of cognitive performance: errors in execu-
tion of skill-based tasks were termed lapses, and
errors in execution of rule and knowledge based
behaviours were termed mistakes in his Generic
Error-Modelling System.1 Lapses characteristically
relate to an error in the actual execution of the
task, whilst mistakes are more abstract errors,
relating to errors in planning (where a strategy not
suitable for the situation is carried out), or in
problem-solving. In the case of lapses, the plan is
correct but the actions are carried out incorrectly,
leading to an error; whereas in the case of
mistakes, the actions are carried out correctly,
but it is instead the plan which is incorrect.
Model of factors influencing surgical
errors
Performing highly skilled surgical tasks involves
a cognitive cascade of complex processes for the
surgeon.21 However, this ‘cutting edge’ may be the
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Figure 2 Rasmussen’s Skill, Knowledge & Rule Model
and Reason’s Generic Error-Modelling System.
78 S.K. Sarker, C. VincentDeath
Adverse
Events
Danger Zone 3 
Danger Zone 2 
Danger Zone 1 
Migration of
Protocols Clinical Protocols
& Dynamic
Adaptation to
Patient’s Clinical
Needs  
Work Stresses
Personal
Stresses
Theatre Team Pressure 
Surgical Team 
Patient & Relatives Pressures
Pa
tie
nt
 O
ut
co
m
e
Patient Factors
Hospital Pressures 
Organizational Pressures
Clinical Excellence
Patient Safety 
Protocols
Too strict
Adherence to
Protocols
Figure 3 Model of factors influencing surgical errors.sharp end of surgery, but this is intricately bound
by many factors which can influence the final
satisfactory or unsatisfactory patient outcome.
Fig. 3 outlines a new theoretical model of how
errors may occur in surgery. It is applicable to the
whole patient pathway. The concept was devel-
oped by the first author after studying migration of
protocols in industry.22 The following section ex-
plains each individual factor influencing surgical
error. Each protocol (skill, rule, knowledge based)
can fluctuate. These include written, unwritten
and verbal protocols e.g. swab and instrument
count, specific surgical technique, clinical treat-
ment and management instructions.
Organisational environment
Factors in the organisational environment may be
important in the surgeon’s level of competency of
an operation and the patients’ outcome. It has
been shown poor patient referral rates can lead to
reduced patient volumes and increases the mor-
tality and morbidity rates for an individual sur-
geon.16,17 The surgeon who does not perform
a particular operation in sufficiently large numbers
may suffer from a procedure specific technical
error rate. Moreover, the surgical unit or firm may
not be familiar of the care of the particular
specialised surgical patient. Apart from these,
health economics in this environment are impor-
tant e.g. funding of staff and equipment which caninfluence the occurrence of errors. It has been
shown that in anaesthesia the combination of
faulty equipment, lack of trained staff, etc. can
lead to errors occurring during an operation.23
Hospital environment
The hospital environments are the various areas
where surgical decisions and care are made outside
the theatre environment. These are in the out-
patient department, endoscopy suite, casualty,
recovery, high dependency or intensive care units,
the ward and multi-disciplinary meetings. These
surgical interfaces are where errors can occur and
may involve many healthcare professionals.
Surgical team
The surgical team may be under pressure to
complete the operation list on time, there may
be factors influencing the operation e.g. inexperi-
enced assistant, or time pressures influencing the
course of the operation e.g. life threatening
emergency in casualty.
Theatre team
The theatre team is important as decisions made
for example by the key players e.g. surgeon,
anaesthetist and scrub nurse if not in unity or in
collaboration can influence the operation being
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tual patient outcome.
Patient and relatives pressures
The surgeon may be under pressure from relatives
or the patient to have a successful outcome. This
may be due to unrealistic expectations or pre-
vious complications or errors occurring to the
patient.
Patient factors
All patients are not the same, and so all the
operations surgeons perform are also heteroge-
neous. Factors like ASA grade, age, BMI, surgical
pathology, etc. all can influence the technical skill
and performance of the surgeon as well as the
post-operative recovery and eventual patient out-
come.24
Surgeons work and personal stresses
During the daily life of a surgeon he or she can be
subjected to various stressful factors which can
influence their performance in decision making,
team interaction and technical skill. Work related
stresses include fatigue due to sleep deprivation,
high workload and long commutes; hierarchal
bullying, time constraints, and poor supervision
for trainee surgeons, communication and team-
work. The motivation of the surgeon controls the
speed of the task, completion, incompletion and
abortion of the concerned task. This factor
interacts with the other factors intimately e.g.
memory, emotions, sleep, etc. and can influence
the occurrence of errors.
Personal stresses may also include fatigue due
to sleep deprivation as a result of a waking baby,
excessive socialising, poor personal fitness or
health, partner relationship problems, family ill-
nesses and difficulties, financial strains, and alco-
hol or drug abuse. The amount of sleep affects the
consciousness and alertness which allows percep-
tion possible. Adults require a minimum of 6e8 h
sleep a day to be adequately rested.25 There are
two patterns of sleep, rapid eye movement (REM)
and non-REM sleep. When sleep is interrupted at
the REM stage of sleep, humans become irritable
and anxious.25 This is seen for example when
doctors have incomplete sleep with interruptions
whilst on-call. This has been shown to affect
surgeons performing tasks.26 All these stressful
factors influence the cerebral cortex in performingthe technical task, and may increase the risk of
errors made by surgeons and compromise their
clinical decisions in theatre. The following ex-
plains how technical errors can be assessed.
Assessment of technical skills errors
A way of measuring technical skill ability may be
to examine the number of errors executed during
the procedure by the surgeon. One study assessed
performance while trainees performed a small
bowel anastomosis on a porcine model and
generated a cumulative error score.27 Eubanks
et al.28 developed a minor and major error score
of the technical errors executed during a laparo-
scopic cholecystectomy in addition to a structured
checklist. Such errors were weighted according to
their severity. Using a categorisation of errors
based on the External Error Modes framework,
Joice et al.29 identified errors executed during
the performance of the laparoscopic cholecystec-
tomy. This categorisation of errors included pro-
cedural errors which were done either because of
the omission or the re-arrangement of steps
during the procedure or execution errors which
were failure of the surgeon to perform a step
correctly.
Seymour et al. developed an error score for the
purposes of a study evaluating the transfer of skill
from virtual reality to real procedures. They found
that those trained on the VR simulator (MIST-
VR, Mentice, Sweden) performed 5 times fewer
errors as compared to those who received conven-
tional training.30 Recent preliminary studies have
assessed the generic and procedure specific tech-
nical skill error rates in open and laparoscopic
surgery.31,32 Such studies suggest that there is
a gradation of types of errors committed by
different surgeons (trainees and consultants).
Error training
Making errors in a controlled environment is
beneficial to surgical trainees, as they can un-
derstand and hopefully prevent such situations
occurring in the future. This is also applicable to
non-trainees. Improvement in decision making can
be achieved by attending such courses as the
Advanced Trauma Life Support (ATLS), Critical
Ill Surgical Patient (CrISP) and Definitive Surgical
Trauma Skills (DSTS). Some of these courses can
improve team performance as they incorporate
practical case scenarios as part of their training
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developed by operating theatre simulation training
which allows the trainee to experience various
crisis situations in the operating theatre, followed
by positive and negative feedback using the
recorded material.33
Trainees can receive surgical technical skill
training in open and laparoscopic surgery from
bench model courses which use synthetic and
animal tissue, or from specific sub-speciality
training courses which may use a combination of
animal or cadaveric material to simulate various
operations. The next possible level in technical
skill training, which is yet to be fully developed,
is to use digital technology to record live oper-
ations so trainees can critique their own oper-
ations and those of experts prospectively and
retrospectively.34
Endoscopic training courses have mainly used
cadaveric material or virtual reality simulators to
teach endoscopic technical skill. However, there
are now endoscopic courses and studies which
combine virtual reality simulators with supervised
real patient endoscopy, thereby bridging the gap
between reality and virtual reality.35 Playback
facilities demonstrate trainees’ errors in perform-
ing endoscopy and prevent and reduce such errors
in the future and improve their technical skill in
the procedure.
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Figure 4 Surgical training to prevent errors.Fig. 4 is a possible algorithm for surgical trainees
could use for error and simulation training to
improve their clinical skills.11 Trainees and their
trainers must also address other issues which can
affect surgical performance e.g. work and personal
stresses.
Conclusion
Currently the research in adverse events and
errors in surgery has mainly concentrated on
estimations of these in healthcare or error scoring
regarding technical skill. These studies demon-
strate that errors are rife in surgery but only
represent the tip of the surgical error iceberg.
One recent report36 described errors in healthcare
as ‘a national problem of epidemic proportions’.
Errors occurring in healthcare are not a disease
and cannot be treated or excised. Error is a symp-
tom of a process in healthcare which is not running
smoothly for what ever reason.
Surgery as a dynamic speciality is prone to
more errors occurring than others. This dynamism
is harder to control, with strict protocols more
difficult to implement compared to other
branches of medicine. However, we must not be
deterred in our quest to understand why errors in
surgery occur and how to prevent them in the
future. In recent years there has been a concerted
drive in the UK with various healthcare agencies
involved to reduce errors.37 This is commendable,
as an organisational or a systems approach to
error is the key to the problem. However, we
must not forget the simple measures which could
be implemented to prevent errors at the ‘shop
floor’.38
Practicing surgery and medicine in the 21st
century will embrace new medications, technolo-
gies, equipment, operations, etc. which aim to
improve the treatment and care of patients.
However, we must remember with this constant
evolution in healthcare the error goalposts are
forever moving, so we must be vigilant not to take
our eye off the error ball.
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